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Agency, Scarcity, and Mortality
Abstract
It is often argued, most recently by Samuel Scheffler, that we should
reconcile with our mortality as constitutive of our existence: as essential
to its temporal structure, to the nature of deliberation, and to our basic
motivations and values. Against this reconciliatory strategy, I argue that
there is a kind of immortal existence that is coherently conceivable and
potentially desirable. First, I argue against the claim that our existence
has a temporal structure with a trajectory that necessarily culminates in
an ending. This claim is based on two false assumptions: that a life as a
whole calls for narrative structure, and that narratives necessarily require
closure as temporal endings. Second, I reject the proposal that temporal
finitude is constitutive of the basic elements of diachronic agency, includ-
ing the nature of deliberation and of our values. I argue that only finitude
as scarcity of opportunities is constitutive of these elements. Additionally,
scarcity might be present in an endless existence. Therefore, it is not inco-
herent to conceive of a recognizable and potentially desirable immortality
that grounds the core features of diachronic agency. Thus, against the rec-
onciliatory strategy, I conclude that we might never fully reconcile with
mortality. Although we might embrace our inescapable mortality as es-
sential to a fuller range of features of our existence, we can still justifiably
regret our missing on an immortal existence.
1 Introduction1
1.1 Reconciling with Our Mortality
1.1.1 When we contemplate the prospect of our death, it is not
uncommon to respond with fear, despair, or angst. Even if we
do not go as far as Tolstoy (1884) in thinking that a finite exis-
tence is ultimately futile and meaningless, we might still lament
1 For conversations, comments, and criticisms, I would like to
thank Clotilde Calabi, John Martin Fisher, Jay L. Garfield, Peter J. Gra-
ham, Masaki Ichinose, Joshua Landy, Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin, Richard
Moran, Elisa Paganini, Eric Schwitzgebel, Alessandro Zucchi, and audi-
ences at the University of Milan, the University of Tokyo, and the Im-
mortality Project capstone conference at UC-Riverside. A special thank
to John Martin Fischer and his team for their wonderful job in direct-
ing and organizing the ‘Science and Philosophy of Immortality’ project.
This paper was written with the generous support of the John Temple-
ton Foundation. The views presented in this paper do not necessarily
reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
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and mourn the necessary finitude of our life and long for an end-
less existence.
Further reflection on the nature of our life might, however,
convince us otherwise. Our mortality might turn out to be essen-
tial to our kind of existence: temporal finitude might be a central
constitutive factor of our cares and values, of our basic motivation
to act, and of the meaningfulness of our life.2
Ultimately, the very idea that we might have an endless
life, or at least a value-laden one, might be conceptually inco-
herent. If so, we should reconcile ourselves with our mortal-
ity. We should no longer mourn our finitude, and we should
stop desiring something—an immortal existence—that is a “fantasy
. . . inherently confused and in principle unsatisfiable,” (Scheffler
2013: 208).
1.1.2 The most articulate and promising defense of this ‘reconcil-
iatory strategy,’ as I will call it, has been recently offered by Schef-
fler (2013). Scheffler argues that temporal finitude is constitutive
of such things as the characteristic temporal structure of our ex-
istence, the fundamental structure of deliberation and its objects,
the basic motivation to engage in any activity whatsoever, the de-
velopment of a sense of self, and the nature of many of our cares,
values, and virtues. In Scheffler’s words: “Our lives are so perva-
sively shaped by the understanding of them as temporally limited
that to suspend that understanding would call into question the
conditions under which we value our lives and long for their ex-
tension.” From which he concludes, “we need to die. . . because
an eternal life would, in a sense, be no life at all,” Scheffler (2013:
95–6).
1.1.3 In this paper, I will argue that these attempts at reconcili-
ation are not fully satisfactory. Although they correctly call at-
2 See Malpas (1998), May (2009), Nussbaum (1989), Nussbaum (1994:
225–32)—but compare later recantation in Nussbaum (1999) and Nuss-
baum (2013)— Scheffler (2013), and Smuts (2011). This suggestion is
also part of the famous discussion of immortality in Williams (1973), al-
though many of the responses to Williams focus on his claim about the
undesirability of immortality as boring rather than on claims about its
inconceivability or unrecognizability.
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tention to the core features of our temporal existence, they fail
to prove that mortality—as the necessary temporal finitude of our
existence—is truly constitutive of them. I will argue that there
is another dimension under which we are primarily finite and
bounded—the scarcity of the opportunities for action. This scarcity
is the necessary and often sufficient condition for the conceivabil-
ity and recognizability of a temporally extended existence. If so,
there is a kind of immortality that we might be able to coherently
conceive and possibly desire. Even if we acknowledge that many
valuable aspects of our existence are intimately related to our mor-
tality and that our death is inescapable, we might still be able to
make sense of our longing for immortality. If so, we might never
fully reconcile with the prospect of our eventual death. Or so I
will argue.
1.1.4 I will frame my discussion around the two main themes in
Scheffler’s defense of the reconciliatory strategy. First, I will con-
sider whether our existence has a temporal structure with a charac-
teristic trajectory that necessarily culminates in an ending. Special
attention will be given to the suggestion that our lives necessarily
call for a narrative structure and that this structure can achieve clo-
sure only by our dying. I will argue that the narrative proposal has
some merit in highlighting the distinctive temporal unity of por-
tions of our existence, but it is mistaken in claiming that this unity
should embrace a whole life. Additionally, the narrative proposal
is mistaken in thinking that narrative closure should necessarily
take the form of a temporal ending. There can be closure in an
activity or in a portion of one’s life in the form of a ‘dynamic
resolution’—that is, the proper fitting of the temporal elements in
a cross-temporal pattern, a fitting that is still compatible with (and
at times might actually promote) the continuation of the activity
or existence in question.
Second, I will consider the proposal that temporal finitude
is a necessary constitutive factor of the basic elements of our di-
achronic agency, including the distinctive character of our practi-
cal predicament, the nature and structure of deliberation, and the
basic cares and values that guide our conduct. I will argue that
the truly necessary factor is the scarcity of opportunities for ac-
tion and that this scarcity might in principle be present even in
an endless existence. Therefore, I will claim, it is not conceptually
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incoherent to think of an immortal existence that still grounds the
core aspects of our existence as diachronic agents. Against the rec-
onciliatory strategy, I contend that there is at least one conceivable
(and potentially desirable) kind of immortal existence and thus we
cannot be fully reconciled with our mortality as the necessary pre-
condition of the coherent conceivability of any recognizable exis-
tence.
I will conclude by claiming that, even if we might embrace
our inescapable mortality as essential to a fuller range of features
of our human existence, in our capacity as diachronic agents, we
might still harbor a justifiable regret for our missing on a particular
kind of immortal existence.
1.1.5 My conclusion rests on a conjecture about the conceivability
of a particular kind of immortal life. It is notoriously difficult to
offer a conclusive proof about conceivability claims, even more so
for claims that rest on such notions as agency, personal identity,
and the idea of an infinite amount of time. However, I hope that
my considerations are at least successful in shifting the burden of
proof back onto the reconciliatory strategy.
In order to be fully reconciled with our mortality, therefore,
we still need to be shown that there could be no room for any co-
herent longing for some kind of conceivable endless existence. But
lacking a convincing argument to that effect, we are justify in re-
maining ambiguous about the prospect of our inevitable demise.
Although much of what we find choiceworthy and valuable in
our finite lives might necessarily depend on our mortality, I will
argue that an immortal life under scarcity of opportunities still ex-
hibits the distinctive and desirable basic features of our diachronic
agency. Being deprived of this kind of immortal life, therefore, is
something that we might still find regrettable and deplorable, even
while embracing many of the things that only our mortality could
offer us.
1.1.6 Before proceeding, a couple of clarifications are in order. In
this paper, by ‘mortality’ I mean the ‘necessary temporal finitude’
of our individual existence—that is, the fact that our lives have not
only a beginning but also an inevitable temporal upper bound.
What is under discussion is not any specific finite length that our
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lives might have, but the general fact that they are necessarily tem-
porally finite and thus, sooner or later, they terminate for good.
When I talk about ‘immortality’ I am only referring to an
indefinitely long individual or personal existence. I am not go-
ing to discuss what Scheffler (2013) calls the ‘collective afterlife’—
the possibility that, although individual lives are necessarily finite,
humanity will continue to exist forever. In addition, in order to
simplify the discussion and focus on the question of the basic rela-
tionship between finitude and the structure of agency, I will make
a few assumptions. Whenever I talk about immortal existence I
assume that all subjects are immortal and that: they all know to
be immortal, they do not age, and they do not necessarily face an
‘over-population’ problem. Finally, I am interested in lives that
extend in time. Hence, when talking about immortality I have in
mind ‘sempiternal’ or ‘everlasting’ existence rather than an atem-
poral or timelessly ‘eternal’ one.3
2 Mortality and Narrative
2.1 Narrative and Temporal Unity
2.1.1 Scheffler (2013: 96) correctly remarks that, as biological or-
ganisms, our existence is characterized by a basic division in dis-
tinct stages, including those of “birth, maturation, deterioration,
and death,” each of which comes with its “characteristic tasks, chal-
lenges, and potential rewards.”
Could this observation help us reconcile with our mortal-
ity? It does not seem so. That our biological development frames
many of our substantive concerns does not show that we could not
conceive and desire an existence free of these biological impera-
tives, especially those of eventual deterioration and death. It seems
3 Those writing on immortality are not always careful about this dis-
tinction and use ‘eternal life’ to refer that a life with an infinite duration
in time, that is, to what should be more properly called a ‘sempiternal
life.’ This is the case, for instance, of the quote from Scheffler (2013: 95)
above. For more on the distinction between eternity and sempiternity,
see Helm (2014).
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plausible that we could conceive and desire an existence that is
perpetually stuck at the mature stage. Biological deterioration and
eventual death appear to be unfortunate and regrettable features of
our existence. And the fact that they are inevitable provides little,
if any, consolation for our mortality.
2.1.2 When Scheffler (2013: 100) recapitulates his view on the
necessary stages of human life, however, he no longer presents the
stages in biological terms. He talks about a more general tempo-
ral structure: “it is essential to our idea of a life that it is tempo-
rally bounded, with a beginning, a middle, and an end.” Although
it might not accord with Scheffler’s intention, this passage could
be interpreted along the lines of the ‘narrative view’ of mortality.
According to this view—championed among others by Nussbaum
(1994), Malpas (1998), May (2009), and Ismael (2006)—our lives
are structured by narratives, and an endless existence could never
reach the closure to which our mortal lives aspire on account of
their narrative structures.4
There is no guarantee that death gives us closure, of course.
Death might be untimely, occurring either too soon (prior to our
reaching the proper ending of our life-narrative) or too late (after
our existence has already reached its narrative closure and it is just
dragging on). But we should welcome our mortality as the neces-
sary precondition for the possibility of reaching a timely closure
in the master narrative of our existence. Or so the narrative view
claims.
4 The connection between human mortality and narrative closure
plays a prominent role in the classic discussions of narrative by Kermode
(2000) and Brooks (2012). For them, a narrative with closure as a tempo-
ral ending helps us gain an understanding of the distinctive temporality
of our existence and to confront its necessary finitude. A narrative-cum-
closure is our distinctive way of coping with and trying to make sense of
our mortality, once we realize that it is our inescapable condition. It is
important to notice that their order of explanation is the reverse of the
narrative view I am discussing. According to the narrative view, given
that our lives could only make sense in terms of a narrative-cum-closure,
we should come to accept the temporal boundedness of our existence
as the only temporal structure that would give us narrative closure and
the understanding associated with it. For Kermode and Brooks, instead,
given that we are necessarily mortal, we should help ourselves of the
resources of narrative to deal with mortality.
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2.1.3 Unfortunately, there are two basic problems with this ac-
count. First, it is highly controversial whether lives require a mas-
ter narrative that covers their entire span.5 Even if narratives might
be widespread in guiding, explaining, and describing many activ-
ities in which we engage, guidance by a single master narrative is
not necessary in order to have a recognizable and desirable life.
This conclusion does not rule out that some agents might have or
seek a master narrative that covers their entire lives, and that they
might, thereby, find some comfort in their mortality. But this is
hardly a recipe for all.
2.1.4 Second, even if it were true that our kind of temporally ex-
tended existence requires a master narrative, it does not follow that
narrative closure can only come to a finite life. Contrary to what
the narrative view claims, a narrative does not require a closure in
the form of a terminus—a temporal end point. As I have argued
in Ferrero (2009), narrative closure can be attained in the form of
a dynamic and ongoing resolution, a resolution that is compatible
with the continuation of an activity and that might actually pro-
pel it further (for instance, take the case of a potentially endless
series of harmonic resolutions in a musical composition like a per-
petuum mobile). A narrative achieves closure when its elements
come to fit together in a pattern that extends over time and that
confers a distinctive significance to these elements. But the com-
pletion of the pattern—the closure that is reached when all the
elements are properly fitting into place—does not have to bring
the narrative, and what the narrative describes and explains, to a
temporal stop.
Hence, even if a recognizable and desirable human life would
have to take a narrative form, this would not help us with mor-
tality. The presence of a narrative might move us to make sure
that we reach its closure, but this closure might take the dynamic
form that allows for both the narrative and the existence to con-
tinue into an indefinite future, while continuing to seek a series
of dynamic closures that might continue to propel both the nar-
rative and the existence forward ad infinitum. As a result of these
closures, the narrative might go through changes and transforma-
tions, but it might never demand that it be eventually completed
5 See for instance Strawson (2004) and Williams (2009).
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and terminated once and for all.6
2.1.5 Notice that the trouble with the narrative view concerns
only the application of a single master narrative to an entire life.
I am not objecting to the central role that narratives play within
lives. As I argued in Ferrero (2009), narratives provide the basic
forms of description and explanation of temporally extended in-
tentional activities. This is because narratives are distinctively apt
at conveying the basic features of temporally unified activities. Let
me explain.
An activity can extend over time by mere continuity. In
this case, each momentary action sets the stage for the following
momentary action, by creating or preserving the conditions un-
der which the following action takes place. A momentary action
might also indirectly affect more distant actions by delayed causal
effects. But throughout this series of actions, there is no attempt
by the agent at securing any integration of the activity as a tempo-
ral whole that extends over an interval that embraces both past and
future times. The activity simply flows from moment to moment,
without any regard for its overall shape.
By contrast, a ‘temporally unified activity’ is one in which
the various stages are undertaken over an extended interval in light
of their expected contribution to cross-temporal patterns of ac-
tions, experiences, and attitudes; patterns that give significance to
these very actions, experiences, and attitudes—first of all as the
actions, experiences, and attitudes of the selfsame subject. A tem-
porally unified activity is one whose different momentary stages
relate to each other in a coherent and cohesive way that makes
possible the realization of the cross-temporal patterns. A perspic-
uous description of such an activity needs to show how its various
stages fit together in this distinctive way.
The contribution of the elements can be appreciated only
when they are seen as parts of the overall cross-temporal pattern
that they bring about, that is, as part of the performance of the
temporally unified activity itself. A narrative is specifically suited
to describe and explain a temporally unified activity as temporally
6 For further criticisms of the narrative view of mortality, see Fischer
(2005) and Rosati (2013: §3.3).
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unified. This is because a narrative description uses devices that
highlight not just the causal connections between the described
events but also the cross-temporal patterns in which they enter,
which helps us see their teleological contribution to the success
of the activity and their significance both within the activity itself
and, more generally, within the agent’s larger plans (contrast a nar-
rative with the description provided by a simpler chronicle, which
only describes the stages in their temporal sequence with no indi-
cation of their mutual connections but for their relative standing
in the temporal sequence).
2.2 Temporal Horizons of Integration
2.2.1 The distinction betweenmere continuity and temporal unity
applies not just to activities but also to portions of the agent’s
life (if not to the entire life itself). In mere continuity, the mo-
mentary stages of the agent’s existence follow each other without
any attempt at cross-temporal integration. In a temporally unified
stretch of existence, instead, the various stages are supposed to re-
late to each other over that temporal interval so as to secure some
diachronic integration.7
Let’s call the stretch of one’s own existence over which an
agent is subjected to pressures for diachronic integration the ‘in-
terval of temporal identification and integration.’ These pressures
take various forms: demands to live up to the intentions one has ac-
quired and the commitments one has undertaken; pressures to take
responsibility and being held accountable for one’s past actions;
demands to agglomerate and integrate one’s pursuits to avoid con-
flicts (which might make their joint pursuit either impossible or
too costly).
There might be different kinds of temporal integration, with
various degrees of tolerance of conflicts and inconsistencies, but
7 I find much to agree with the characterization of the structure of
unity offered in Malpas (1998), including the connection with narrative,
but Malpas is mistaken in thinking that this structure applies to a life
as a whole and thus that a life as a whole is to be organized around a
narrative. This mistake, in turn, invalidates much what he says about
the necessary role played by mortality in giving significance to our lives.
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for present purposes we do not need to discuss any particular stan-
dard or model of diachronic integration. Our concern is only with
the general outline of the demands of temporal unity as opposed
to those of mere continuity.
2.2.2 The horizon of temporal identification and integration need
not extend to the agent’s entire life. There might be distal portions
of one’s existence to which one presently relates only by mere con-
tinuity. Although the continuity might be sufficient for temporal
identity, the lack of the stronger kind of temporal identification
and integration limits the pressures that come from and are di-
rected toward the portions that fall outside the horizon of tempo-
ral identification. For instance, consider the ‘outgrowing’ of com-
mitments as one gets older. Leaving behind certain projects as we
mature is a typical instance of the changes in the temporal horizon
of our identification and integration. Even if we do not lose the
direct and first-person psychological access to our younger selves,
that access no longer carries the pressures (both motivational and
rational) toward temporal integration that we still acknowledge
from a more recent past.
A similar distinction might also apply to projections and an-
ticipations concerning our future selves. Very distant selves might
be taken to be outside of the reach of one’s present commitments,
projects, cares, and values. One might anticipate that, at some
point, along the line of temporal continuity, one will have grad-
ually come to outgrow, move away, or simply lose one’s present
commitments and, more generally, one’s present practical stand-
point. When so, there is a limit to the temporal reach, both past
and future, of one’s present demands for temporal integration.
This is not an unfamiliar scenario within the standard temporal
span of our lives. But it is likely to become a standard feature of
lives that last much longer than our ordinary ones, and a fortiori
of immortal lives.
2.2.3 How does the temporal integration within these intervals
relate to the idea of narrative? And how does it bear on our stance
toward mortality? Let’s begin with narrative.
Amaster narrative can provide the organizing principle within
an interval of temporal integration. When so, there is a substan-
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tive goal or set of goals that exerts overarching guidance over that
interval. But temporal integration does not require a single sub-
stantive master project. It can just take the form of a more general
structural demand: to secure consistency between the various sub-
stantive pursuits that one undertakes within that interval against
the background of a (relatively) stable practical standpoint. The
only narrative that covers the entire interval is the story of ‘trying
to keep oneself together over that interval as an integrated agent.’
This is indeed something one is trying to live up to but only as a
structural constraint that frames the more specific and substantive
first-order endeavors in which one is engaged.
Notice that the narrative devices of description and expla-
nation still apply to the pursuit of this structural demand. This
is because in order to achieve and maintain temporal integration
one needs to secure cross-temporal patterns not just within single
activities but also across them, in the interest of non-conflictual
coordination and agglomeration. The narrative structure of struc-
tural integration, however, does not lend support to the idea of
closure as temporal termination. Quite the contrary. Temporal
integration is a constant work in progress. Whatever closure one
might achieve, it is just a temporary matter. Novel challenges are
expected to arise because one continues to operate as an agent in
time. The diachronic integration that might be achieved at any
particular time is not an everlasting achievement. It is rather a
paradigmatic example of ‘dynamic resolution’ (see 4). The closure
that one might achieve at any particular time is only the present
but momentary success of an ongoing and potentially open-ended
process, rather than a place where one can rest on one’s laurels.
2.2.4 The trouble with the narrative view of mortality is that it
confuses the distinctive structure of ongoing temporal integration
that operates throughout our existence, or at least large portions
of it, with the temporal unity imposed by a single substantive first-
order narrative with a temporal terminus. Once we get clear on
the dynamic character of temporal integration and the associated
narrative descriptions and explanations, we are no longer in a po-
sition to find consolation for our mortality in the alleged demand
that a life be structured around a single master narrative.
2.2.5 Reflection on the structure of ongoing temporal integra-
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tion, however, might suggest a different kind of concern with an
endless existence. Could such existence achieve temporal integra-
tion across all of its infinite duration? If not, we might be unable
to recognize and desire an endless existence.
There seem to be two main problems with the suggestion
that temporal integration could embrace a life of indefinite dura-
tion. First, could a subject have the psychological resources to keep
track and hold together all of the elements of this immortal life?
Second, even if the psychological resources were up to this task,
could there be cross-temporal patterns of actions and attitudes that
extend over the entire span of immortal life?
These questions raise legitimate concerns. As temporally
and psychologically finite subjects, we might be unable to project
ourselves into an endless existence that tries to achieve temporal
integration over its infinite duration. It might be unfathomable
to us what it is like to secure integration over that temporal hori-
zon and to have the required psychological resources (see Burley
2009b). Even so, this does not yet lend support to the idea that
temporal finitude is essential to any recognizable existence.
2.2.6 This is because the finitude need not be in the extension of
the entire life but only in the temporal horizon of identification
and integration. As discussed above, the agent at any particular
moment might have a limited temporal interval, both in the past
and in the future, over which she is trying to achieve diachronic
integration. The temporal limitation might have several compati-
ble sources. For instance, with respect to a certain portion of the
past, the agent might have lost access to it, no longer remembering
it in a way that would sustain first-person identification. Or she
might have outgrown or rejected prior commitments, preferences,
cares, and values so that her current practical standpoint no longer
puts pressure for identification with this past.
Likewise for the future: there are distal portions of one’s
future in which one cannot project oneself if not in the form of
a most generic anticipation—one expects to be there as a result of
mere continuity. The anticipation along mere lines of continuity
is still done from a first-person perspective, but only in a ‘generic’
form, since one might be unable to assign any substantive practical
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standpoint to the distal self that one is projecting into. That is,
one might be unable to anticipate which specific commitments,
preferences, cares, and values one will have at that future time.
When so, one has no substantive grounds on which to try to secure
temporal integration from the present time. One is only under a
most general and generic prudential pressure to secure the basic
preconditions for the success of one’s future projects, whatever
those might turn out to be.
The temporal limit in the horizon of diachronic identifica-
tion and integration is a familiar feature in our lives, especially
when we consider the relations that we might have to portions of
our life several years or decades away from us, both in the past and
in the future.
2.2.7 A finite temporal horizon is also amoving one. As the agent
travels through time, so does her horizon of integration. Some
portions of one’s past existence can drop out of it, while some por-
tions of the future existence might get included. The rate at which
the horizon changes is not necessarily proportional to the passage
of time. But when a substantial amount of time has elapsed, we
usually expect a similarly sizable movement and re-centering of the
temporal horizon. In addition, the change is not usually limited to
the temporal expanse of the reach of the pressures for integration.
The change also occurs in the practical standpoint from which the
integration is to be pursued, given that the passage of time is likely
to alter commitments, preferences, cares, and values.
For a while, the temporal horizons one has at different times
might overlap. But over longer temporal intervals, the overlap is
likely to cease. When there is no overlap, there are portions of
one’s past and future that fall outside of the pressure of tempo-
ral integration with one’s present time and the other portions of
one’s existence that still fall within the limited temporal horizon
of integration. With respect to the portions that fall outside of the
horizon, one is no longer under a pressure of integration. One is
only under the demands imposed by mere continuity.
2.2.8 The existence of non overlapping horizons of integration
generates complicated problems for diachronic practical rational-
ity, which even our best theories of rationality might not be fully
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equipped to deal with. The difficulty is in handling the mixing of
the generic prudential demands toward the distal selves, which fall
outside of the horizon of integration, together with the more spe-
cific demands for temporal integration within the horizon, while
knowing that the horizon continues to move and reshape over
time.
These complications are likely to be exacerbated in very
long lives, especially in indefinitely long ones.8 However, what-
ever difficulties we might encounter in formulating the correct
principles of diachronic practical rationality, these difficulties do
not show that there is any conceptual incoherence in trying to
imagine our projection into longer and potentially endless lives.
What might be troubling is to imagine a temporal integration that
embraces an infinite life within a single all-encompassing horizon.
But what I am suggesting here is that we could imagine a pro-
jection into an infinite life as a sequence of partially overlapping,
finite, and moving horizons of temporal integration—a projection
in which, I contend, we already engage within our own lives when
we look at them over long temporal intervals. Even if the tem-
poral horizons of integration are necessarily finite, therefore, this
finitude does not tell against the conceivability of an immortal ex-
istence.
2.2.9 One might still object to this conceivability on the grounds
that over an indefinitely long period of time, an agent is likely to
undergo such a massive and radical series of transformations that
we are utterly clueless about what she might be like in the long
run. We cannot even rely on the evidence of the transformations
that we observe in other agents around us. Those are limited to
the small range of changes that are possible within the lifespan of
humans, which is just a minuscule fraction of an endless existence.9
8 Our relations with the distal stages are further complicated by
the possibility that, over the long term, we might find our survival to
be threatened, even if the changes have been gradual and continuity-
preserving. Altshuler (2016) interestingly argues that the existence of
this threat might depend on whether we take a forward-looking or a
backward-looking perspective toward the distal stages, a difference that
has important implications in the discussion of the conceivability of an
immortal existence.
9 Our relations with the distal stages are further complicated by
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It is true that we might be clueless about the substantive
content of future practical standpoints over extremely long periods
of time. But this concern is not sufficient to make us celebrate our
mortality. The structure of future projection via a moving finite
temporal horizon of diachronic integration is utterly familiar. By
its nature, it lends itself seamlessly to a potentially indefinite exten-
sion. It has no built-in stopping point. At no moment should the
agent see her life as calling for a termination simply on account of
the finite extension of the horizon of temporal integration. Even
if she is in the dark about what her life is going to look like beyond
the horizon, she also expects to get there, more or less gradually,
while always being at the center of a moving temporal horizon of
identification and integration. The distal future might constantly
remain unfathomable to the agent, but as she moves along, so does
the horizon of the unfathomable future.
This is not to deny that one might anticipate that, at some
point, one’s life won’t be worth living further, even if it could ex-
tend forever (or maybe because it would extend forever). But this
might raise an issue for immortal life as such only if the problem
were to arise for all agents necessarily and not just in particular
circumstances. One might argue so only if one could show that all
goods are eventually exhaustible. If so, even a life of moving hori-
zons might eventually run into inescapable and persistent bore-
dom, even if one were to allow for the repetition of some cycles in
changing practical standpoint.10 The issue of the exhaustibility of
goods is an important one and it is worth of further investigation.
But even if one were to prove that there are no inexhaustible goods,
this does not yet show that we cannot coherently conceive of an
immortal existence. At most, it would show that such existence
would be eventually undesirable. This would, however, be as a re-
the possibility that, over the long term, we might find our survival to
be threatened, even if the changes have been gradual and continuity-
preserving. Altshuler (2016) interestingly argues that the existence of
this threat might depend on whether we take a forward-looking or a
backward-looking perspective toward the distal stages, a difference that
has important implications in the discussion of the conceivability of an
immortal existence.
10 For some recent discussions of boredom and immortality, see Bur-
ley (2009a), Bortolotti and Nagasawa (2009), and Fischer and Mitchell-
Yellin (2014).
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sult of a different question than the one that we are pursuing here.
What we are interested in here is only whether the temporal struc-
ture of an extended existence would by itself make an immortal
life, even one with finite horizons of integration, unconceivable.
2.2.10To sum up, the narrative view is correct in suggesting that
the concept of a narrative might help describe and explain a dis-
tinctive temporal structure, one that we find both in many of our
extended activities and in large portions or stages of our existence.
But the narrative view is mistaken in thinking that a narrative both
(a) requires closure in the form of a temporal terminus or ending,
and (b) necessarily applies to each life as a whole. Without these
two assumptions, however, the narrative view cannot prove that
our mortality is a constitutive factor of the kinds of lives that we
can coherently conceive. The narrative version of the reconcil-
iatory strategy, therefore, cannot show that the very idea of our
immortal existence is conceptually confused. As such, it fails to
offer any consolation at the prospect of our eventual death.
3 Mortality and Diachronic Agency
3.1 A New Reconciliation?
3.1.1 Let’s now consider a different version of the reconciliatory
strategy, one that focuses on the connection between necessary
temporal finitude and various dimensions of diachronic agency:
the distinctive character of our practical predicament, the nature
and structure of deliberation, and the basic cares and values that
guide our conduct.
Scheffler, once again, offers a very clear and articulate state-
ment of this strategy. First, he argues that mortality is required to
make sense of the concepts that characterize what I will call our
‘plight’ as diachronic agents, namely, the concepts of
loss, illness, injury, harm, risk, and danger. . . [which] de-
rive much of their content from our standing recogni-
tion that our lives are temporally bounded, that we are
subject to death at any moment, and that we are certain
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to succumb to it in the end. In a life without death,
the meaning of all these concepts would be called into
question. Yet without them, it is equally unclear what
would be meant by such concepts as those of health,
gain, safety, security, and benefit. (Scheffler 2013: 97)
Second, temporal finitude determines the character and struc-
ture of practical deliberation. As Scheffler writes, in trying to
imagine immortal creatures,. . .
we are trying to imagine creatures who have little in
their existence that matches our experience of tragic or
even difficult choices, and nothing at all that matches
our experience of decisions made against the background
of the limits imposed by the ultimate scarce resource,
time. But every human decision is made against that
background, and so in imagining immortality we are
imagining an existence in which there are, effectively,
no human decisions. (Scheffler 2013: 99)
In addition, our values are intimately related to temporal
finitude. Scheffler (2013: 205) claims that mortality is a condition
on our being “guided not just by our values, but by any value at
all.” As he further explains,
[it is unclear] what place there is for human values in
such an [immortal] existence, for consider the extent to
which our assignments of value are a response to the lim-
its of time. These limits, and especially the constraints
they impose upon us in the contexts of decision, force
upon us the need to establish priorities, to guide our
lives under a conception of which things are worth do-
ing and caring about and choosing. Without such limits,
it is at best unclear how far we would be guided by ideas
of value at all. (Scheffler 2013: 99)
Finally, here is a nice summary of Scheffler’s overall view:
the aspects of life that we cherish most dearly—love and
labor, intimacy and achievement, creativity and humor
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and solidarity and all the rest—all have the status of val-
ues for us because of their role in our finite and bounded
lives. . . . [O]ur confidence in the values that make our
lives worth living depends on the place of the things
that we value in the lives of temporally bounded crea-
tures like ourselves. (Scheffler 2013: 100)
3.1.2 I will use the expression ‘concepts of diachronic agency’ (or
CoDA) to refer to the set of all these notions that, as Scheffler
convincingly argues, are at the core of our distinctive kind of ex-
istence. CoDA comprises all the concepts that characterize our
plight as temporal agents, including those that characterize (i) the
nature of deliberation, decision, and choices; and (ii) the character
of our distinctive cares and values. The new version of the recon-
ciliatory strategy can thus be formulated as follows: our mortality,
i.e., our necessary temporal finitude, is constitutive of the conceiv-
ability and potential desirability of any existence that, like ours, is
essentially and distinctively characterized in terms of the ‘concepts
of diachronic agency’ or CoDA.
3.1.3 I have no qualms about Scheffler’s claim about the role of
CoDA in the conceivability of our distinctive kind of temporal
existence. I also find prima facie plausible that mortality might be
sufficient to ground CoDA. But the reconciliatory strategy requires
a stronger claim: that mortality is necessary to ground CoDA.
In the rest of this paper, pace the reconciliatory strategy, I
will show that what is truly essential to CoDA is a more general
form of finitude—the scarcity of opportunities for action. Although
mortality is usually sufficient to generate this scarcity, I will argue
that it is not necessary. In principle, we can conceive of a kind of
immortal life that supports CoDA and it is thus both recognizable
and potentially desirable. If so, we cannot find any consolation for
our mortality at the thought that any longing for immortality is
necessarily conceptually confused.
3.2 CoDA and Vulnerabilities
3.2.1 Let’s begin by noticing that there is a common feature to
the elements of CoDA. More or less directly, all these concepts
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concern our vulnerability to different kinds of ‘losses’ or ‘nega-
tive occurrences.’ The first and simplest kind of loss is associated
with the experience of pain. Second, there is the loss of ‘disap-
pointment,’ which we experience when expectations and desires
are frustrated. Third, there is what might be called the ‘loss of
standing’ or ‘status,’ which is generated by betrayal, neglect, aban-
donment, discrimination, and the like.11
These three sorts of loss do not necessarily depend on tem-
poral finitude. One can make sense of and be subjected to these
losses independently of one’s mortality. This is easy to see in the
case of pain, whose occurrence might be a temporally local matter:
the experience of pain at any particular moment can be utterly in-
dependent of one’s states, including other pain, at other past and
future moments.
3.2.2 The losses of disappointment and status, instead, might have
a diachronic dimension. In particular, a disappointed attitude or
a lost status is often acquired well in advance of the time of the
loss. The content of the attitude or the nature of the status often
depend on or concern the subject’s prior history. Nonetheless, a
disappointment or a deprivation of status might count as a loss at
the present time regardless of the subject’s future conditions. The
fact that, at a later time, the attitude might come to be satisfied or
the status might come to be regained does not make the present
loss any less real. To this extent, these losses might be temporally
local (even if one might continue to suffer them as long as the dis-
appointment or the loss of status persists). A fortiori, whether we
can experience these losses is not directly related to whether our
existence is finite or infinite.
3.2.3 This is not to deny that the significance and the size of these
losses might be affected by one’s past or future. For instance, the
experience of pain might turn into suffering in part because of the
history of one’s life and its narrative structures (see Dennett 1996:
160 ff ). Similarly, the losses of status and standing might become
much more serious on account of future harms that one is going
to suffer as a result of that loss (such as the costs of frustrated assur-
11 For a more general discussion of the basic vulnerabilities of agency
an their connection to practical reason, see Bagnoli (2016).
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ances, the privation of benefits associated with the lost standing,
etc.). But we can make sense of, and be susceptible to, the basic
form of these losses independently of the future unfolding of our
lives and their expected duration. Temporal finitude is not a con-
stitutive condition of these losses.
Some of the elements of CoDA, therefore, do not seem to
be related to mortality. Pace Scheffler, we do not need to con-
ceive of our lives as temporally bounded to make sense of some
versions of notions such as ‘illness, injury, and harm’ and of our
responses to them by way of such things as ‘love,’ ‘intimacy,’ and
‘solidarity.’ We can easily conceive of forms of comfort and help
for agents who suffer pain, disappointments, and loss of status that
are understandable and meaningful regardless of the mortality of
those involved.
3.3 Scarcity of Opportunities
3.3.1 Consider now the losses associated with limited opportuni-
ties for action. As the agent’s existence unfolds, she can be mod-
eled as tracing a particular trajectory in the space of all the states
she could in principle occupy. At various moments, the agent’s
particular trajectory is determined by the choices she makes over
alternative options, that is, over possible alternative trajectories (or
better, over the sets of repeatedly branching trajectories, given that
in most cases she is expected to face more decision points along
any of the paths she is going to choose from).
All the possible paths that the agent might take over her life-
time form a complicated web of mostly divergent and occasionally
convergent trajectories in the state space. The web of trajectories
constitutes the complete map of the agent’s own ‘garden of fork-
ing paths.’ Some of the areas in the state space might be absolutely
inaccessible, since no possible trajectory might reach them starting
from the agent’s initial position at the very outset of her existence.
Other areas, instead, are only relatively inaccessible. They become
unreachable only as a result of some events or choices, which put
the agent on trajectories that could no long reach these areas.
Each individual trajectory is associated with the places, ob-
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jects, organisms, and people that one might encounter; with a va-
riety of experiences, feelings, and thoughts; and distinctive fail-
ures and accomplishments. Each trajectory is also associated di-
rect costs and benefits (including the resources that need to be ex-
pended, the effort and labor involved, etc. to move along it). The
various features of any particular trajectory can be compared with
those of the alternative trajectories one is choosing from. Some
of the features and elements of the forfeited trajectories are going
to be permanently lost, they could never again be enjoyed by the
agent regardless of her future choices. The elements that are lost
are the ‘permanent opportunity costs’ that one incurs in choosing
any particular path.12 Notice that an agent might be willing to in-
cur the opportunity costs associated with her choice, especially if
none of the alternatives is appealing. An opportunity cost is not
necessarily a substantive price that one is actually going to pay. But
the opportunity costs represent what the agent is permanently giv-
ing up in making her choice.
For the purposes of this paper, we are not interested in how
a rational agent is to go about comparing and choosing between
alternative specific paths. What matters is only the basic structure
of the web of branching trajectories. As we intentionally move in
this space, many of our choices are among alternatives that carry
permanent opportunity costs. The alternatives we choose from
often have features and elements that are not fungible. Therefore,
whenever we make a choice, we cannot but permanently sacrifice
all of these non-fungible items.
3.3.2 Whenever some alternative paths are not fungible and they
become inaccessible after the choice, we can be said to operate un-
der ‘structural scarcity of opportunities’ (hereafter, unless noted
otherwise, I will use ‘scarcity’ to refer to ‘structural scarcity of op-
portunities’). This scarcity is structural. It is entirely a matter of
12 There is also a different kind of opportunity cost one incurs in one’s
choices: the risk of the higher expenses associated with retracing one’s
steps if one changes one’s mind and tries to take a previously forfeited
path that is still accessible. But if the agent ends up retracing some of
her steps, and she actually pays these expenses, she is also thereby in-
curring correlated permanent opportunity costs, since she is depleting
scarce resources, which eventually leads her to permanently giving up
some other alternatives at a future time.
23
the topology of the web of trajectories, that is, of which sets of al-
ternatives are mutually inaccessible and not fungible at any given
point in the state space. But the scarcity is not a matter of either
the number or the goodness of the alternatives. Structural scarcity
only requires that there is at least one non-fungible and eventually
inaccessible path, regardless of how good or bad this path might
be in substantive terms. (Hence, there is structural scarcity even
if all the alternatives that are made inaccessible by one’s choice are
so bad that no rational agent would ever choose them.)
This is not to deny that permanent opportunity costs might
often amount to a substantial loss. Even if the agent has made the
best possible choice, the paths not taken might contain valuable
elements that the agent has permanently forfeited and for which
there is not going to be any adequate compensation along the cho-
sen path. How burdensome the choices are going to be depends,
therefore, on the ‘geography’ of one’s state space, That is, on the
combination of (i) the topology of the web of possible paths with
(ii) the substantial nature of what one is expected to experience,
encounter, and achieve in each particular path.
3.3.3 The geographies of state spaces might vary greatly both in
the complexity of the web of paths and in the extent to which
they exhibit structural scarcity. There is something noteworthy,
however, about the structural scarcity of our world. This scarcity
has two distinctive properties. First, it is not limited to smaller
and insignificant portions of alternative paths, which explains why
alternative paths are not usually fungible. Second, choices tend to
have cumulative permanent effects. As time goes by, progressively
larger and larger areas of the state space become inaccessible as a
result of new choices. Often one cannot retrace one’s steps and
the actual path one takes gets more and more entrenched into a
particular area of the state space, while the rest of the state space
becomes increasingly remote and eventually utterly inaccessible.
As a result, one continues to incur opportunity costs even for paths
that have been forfeited in the remote past. Opportunity costs
might never stop accumulating, especially if, as it is common in
our world, the paths continue to fork and diverge from each other,
leaving little room for any future retracing or for their converging
in a shared landing area at a later time.
24
3.4 Scarcity and CoDA
3.4.1 Let’s get back to the discussion of CoDA—the distinctive
concepts of diachronic agency. What I am going to argue in this
section is that at the basis of CoDA is not temporal finitude but the
structural scarcity of opportunities (henceforth, unless otherwise
noted, I will drop the qualification ‘structural’).
It is easy to see how the scarcity provides the necessary back-
ground for deliberation, decision, and genuine choice. These activ-
ities and the related concepts make sense only in light of the con-
straints imposed by scarce opportunities. Not much would be left,
if anything, of notions such as time-management, risk, urgency,
labor, achievement, and creativity for agents whose trajectories do
not have the topology distinctive of this scarcity and, therefore,
never incur any permanent opportunity costs.
Scarcity of opportunities is also at the core of our plight
as temporal agents. Our distinctive predicament is ultimately a
matter of the pressures we face in plodding through the garden of
forking paths. Simpler aspects of notions such as ‘loss, illness, in-
jury, harm, risk, and danger’ (see 1) might be independent of the
comparison with missed or forfeited opportunities. But these no-
tions can be fully understood only by considering how they affect
agents who operate under scarcity. For what the agent loses (and
what she might risk in order to avoid potential losses) is often best
assessed in terms of the substantial opportunities costs that she
pays when illness, injury, or harm force her to take lesser options
at the time of choice.
Similar considerations can be made even for those vulnera-
bilities that, in their simpler form, have minimal temporal depen-
dencies—like our vulnerability to pain, disappointment, and loss
of status discussed above (see 2). This is because these losses might
become much more poignant when characterized in terms of the
opportunity costs that one incurs as a result of suffering them. In
addition, opportunity costs are relevant to the understanding of
our biological and social vulnerabilities, since biological and social
harms are usually most serious when they reduce our abilities and
opportunities for action.
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In turn, the ideas of solidarity, care, friendship, intimacy,
and love come to their fullest expression only when they are de-
ployed in response to the misery that we might suffer in handling
scarcity and the correlated losses, harms, and sufferings. In sum,
the characteristic fragilities and vulnerabilities of our condition,
and the virtues and vices associated with our handling of them,
are ultimately inseparable from structural scarcity.
Additionally, there is often a narrative dimension to our ac-
tivities and experiences, and narrative patterns are in part compar-
ative in nature: the kind of significance that a narrative pattern
gives to the elements of the activity or experience is not based sim-
ply on how the elements cohere with each other, but also on how
these elements come together by comparison to the opportunities
that, for better or worse, have been forfeited in trying to bring
about the unified activity or experience.13
3.4.2 Last but not least, the comparison with the paths not taken
is at the root of a distinctive emotional manifestation of diachronic
agency—regret. Regret is the affective response that befits our ap-
preciation of the loss of valuable opportunities. We can regret both
retrospectively (because of the forgone opportunities) and prospec-
tively (because of the opportunities that we can anticipate sacrific-
ing as a result of our present and future choices). In addition, we
continue to incur opportunity costs throughout the unfolding of
our life for the opportunities that we have forgone, and thus the re-
gret associated with this loss can continue to increase as time goes
by.
Notice that the regret induced by choosing under scarcity
is not based on any negative assessment of the correctness of our
choices. There can be no fault or blame attached to a choice that
generates this regret. The regret in question is simply the manifes-
tation of our appreciation that something of value has been irre-
trievably sacrificed, not because of our actions but because of the
unfortunate structure of the world, i.e., its structural scarcity. This
13 The idea of this comparison is related to what Rosati (2013: §3.2)
calls the ‘principle of imaginative possibilities,’ according to which “an
individual could not be an agent [and a practical reasoner], a being with
the capacity for self-governance, unless she has the capacity to imagine
otherwise” in deliberating and deciding what she will do.
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regret is thus the characteristic emotional manifestation of our
plight as agents who have to make choices in a world of structurally-
scarce and path-dependent opportunities.14
3.5 Scarcity and Mortality
3.5.1 How is the scarcity of opportunities related to mortality
and temporal finitude? For Scheffler (2013: 99), the basic sources
of CoDA are the “limits imposed by the ultimate scarce resource,
time.” And our necessary mortality, in turn, is what makes time
scarce for us. Scheffler is correct that, given the standard topology
of our state space, death makes time scarce for us and severely re-
stricts the opportunities available to us. But this does not yet show
that death and temporal finitude are indeed necessary (or even suf-
ficient) to ground CoDA, which is what the reconciliation strategy
needs to show if we are to be reconciled with our mortality.
Before proceeding further, let me clarify the important dis-
tinction between temporal finitude and temporal scarcity. Whereas
finitude entails scarcity, the reverse does not hold. When some op-
portunities are scarce, the time to pursue these opportunities is
scarce, but this is not necessarily because time itself is in general
scarce. Time might be infinite, even if the interval in which we
have to take certain opportunities is not. Likewise, one’s indi-
vidual existence might be temporally infinite even if the time to
take specific opportunities is not. But the latter temporal scarcity
is primarily a matter of the scarcity of opportunities, not of any
temporal finitude. The reconciliatory strategy, therefore, needs to
show that the grounds of CoDA lie not just in temporal scarcity
but in temporal finitude, since mortality is a matter of finitude not
just of scarcity.15
14 For further discussion of the role of regret, scarcity, and mortality,
see Rosati (2007: 247, 255) and Rosati (2013: §3.2). For the connection
between value and regret, see Bagnoli (2000).
15 Unfortunately, it is easy to slip from talk of temporal finitude to talk
of temporal scarcity. This happens occasionally in Scheffler’s own work.
In his insightful comments on Scheffler, Kolodny (2013: 166–7) correctly
points out that temporal scarcity does not require a finite existence and
argues that many of the features that Scheffler links to mortality can be
generated by temporal scarcity alone. I am entirely in agreement with
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3.5.2 In order to discuss how mortality and structural scarcity
are related, let’s first consider a scenario where the opportunities
for action are structurally abundant. In this scenario, although the
accessible opportunities might be limited in number, the following
three conditions hold:
1. There are no opportunity costs associated with choosing one
option over any other, because all the open options are utterly
fungible (either because (a) these options are perfectly equiv-
alent in terms of the experiences, encounters, and achieve-
ments that they make possible, the effort that they require,
and the outcomes that they are expected to produce, or (b)
the options, although they are not equivalent, are never per-
manently forfeited, since any option that is forfeited at a time
is going to be available once again in the future);
2. There is tolerance for errors and delays;
3. The agent has sufficient ability and time to go through all the
available options in any order whatsoever, even taking into
account possible errors and delays.
When these conditions hold, the space of opportunities is
structurally abundant. The abundance concerns the relation be-
tween the agent’s choices and the available courses of action. As
in the case of structural scarcity, this abundance is not a matter
of how numerous or good the available options are. For instance,
an agent might be in a structurally abundant situation even if she
only has two open options, and both are terrible. What abundance
requires is only that these two options continue to remain open to
the agent no matter which one she chooses to pursue first. Con-
versely, the agent might have many more and much better options
available to her, and yet be considered to be in a structurally scarce
scenario, if her choices necessarily incur the cost of permanently
forgoing some opportunities.
Kolodny on this point and much of my arguments in these sections are
trying to make a similar point although in more detail than Kolodny
could do in his short remarks. Let me reiterate, however, that what
Kolodny says about temporal scarcity should be reformulated in terms
of scarcity of opportunities, which, as I am arguing in this paper, is the
ultimate source of the temporal scarcity at issue in the present discussion.
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3.5.3 Under structural abundance, one is still exercising diachronic
agency but only in its minimal form. As temporal agents, we are
limited in what we can immediately control and accomplish. As
long as we have some distal goals, we usually need to take dis-
tinct momentary steps over a longer interval to accomplish these
goals. This is the minimal temporal constraint on agency, which
imposes an instrumental order over the momentary steps. Under
abundance, a temporal agent only needs to make sure that, within
the generous time allotment, she sooner or later takes the required
steps in the proper order. But there is no urgency and no concern
with lost opportunities.16
It might still seem that this temporal agent would have to
worry about temporal positional goods. But under abundance,
the positional character of these goods is only nominal, not sub-
stantial. Although it is true that one particular agent might get to
do a certain thing or occupy a certain position earlier than other
agents, that same thing and place (or a perfectly fungible one) will
be available to others at later times. Hence, it does not seem that
under scarcity it truly matters whether one gains any positional
goods or not (although it might still matter that one acquires the
goods in question, but not relative to their temporal position). Po-
sitional goods (both temporal and spatial) are genuinely important
only under the relevant structural scarcity.
3.5.4 Diachronic agency under structural scarcity takes a more
familiar and complex form than diachronic agency under abun-
dance. The agent is expected to do more than just manage the
momentary steps that are instrumentally required within each ac-
tivity. Under scarcity, she needs to pay attention to opportunity
costs, both in choosing among her options and in the implemen-
tation of the chosen alternative. She has to manage her scarce re-
sources, including time, knowing that she is permanently forgoing
some alternatives and that she is taking the risk of committing
costly and possibly irremediable errors.
This is very different from the minimal exercise of diachronic
agency under abundance. Because of its minimal character, agency
16 For a more general discussion of the various dimensions of temporal
agency, see Ferrero (2012).
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under abundance does not ground CoDA.17 This is so even if the
agent is mortal: as long as one’s death is expected to come after
one has enjoyed all that the structural abundance has to offer, time
is not a scarce resource even if it is finite. This is because, under
abundance, at some point additional time would not add any more
opportunities. Once one has had sufficient time to go through
all the permutations of the available options, any additional time
would only allow for repetition of choices that have been made or
could have been made before.18
17 At most the agent might regret getting stuck in a structurally abun-
dant but otherwise undesirable situation.
18 If there is something good in the repetition of an activity already
pursued in the past, the repeated activity is not strictly speaking ‘exactly
equivalent’ to the earlier one. This is because the repeated activity car-
ries the additional value, whatever that is, generated by the repetition.
If repetition brings about any additional value, then time would indeed
be scarce if there is not enough time to allow for the repetition—because
this repetition would effectively count as a novel opportunity one would
be deprived of if time is cut short. Thus, genuine structural abundance
requires that, given the limited set S of the opportunities that it leaves
open, there be enough time to go through as many rounds of all the el-
ements of S as there continue to be valuable repetitions. An interesting
question arises at this point: is the repetition of something valuable al-
ways valuable, even ad infinitum? One way in which repetition might
always be valuable is that it allows for one to continue existing. But if
so, the value is ultimately in the sheer continuation of one’s existence,
regardless of the independent value of what gets repeated. For a dis-
cussion of the possible desirability and value of simply being, see Nagel
(1970) and Rosati (2013: §3.1). Others might instead argue that there is
always additional substantive value due to the distinctive character of the
repeated activity itself. If so, there is always a pressure in favor of end-
less repetitions. But a worry arises in such scenarios: could an infinite
existence in the mode of valuable repetition continue to support CoDA?
This existence is one of structural abundance except that opportunities
for repetition would become scarce if one were to die. However, there
is no loss associated with any of the choices that one is making while
going through the elements of the abundant set S. If so, it seems that we
are facing a very different kind of opportunity costs than the one asso-
ciated with the structural scarcity induced by the branching of mutually
inaccessible paths. What we lose in this scenario is only the opportunity
for some more encores, which is not exactly the kind of loss associated
with the elements of CoDA that we have been discussing thus far. This
is a very interesting issue but one that, unfortunately, needs to be taken
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3.5.5 The temporal finitude of one’s life gives rise to CoDA only
in so far as it contributes to generating structural scarcity. This
is how temporal finitude contributes to scarcity in our lives, but
this finitude is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
structural scarcity. As long as there is structural scarcity of op-
portunities, there are the grounds for a recognizable existence, for
an existence that exhibits all of CoDA, regardless of its expected
duration.
3.6 Endless Scarcity and Immortality
3.6.1 Given that CoDA are grounded in structural scarcity of op-
portunities but not in temporal finitude, I surmise that we might
conceive of agents who can have an immortal life in a universe of
perpetual structural scarcity. This is a universe in which the possi-
ble paths continue to branch out and, when not taken, become per-
petually inaccessible. As an agent moves in this space, she can for-
ever continue to incur opportunity costs—she irremediably loses
some possible experiences, encounters, and achievements, and she
suffers from the permanent separation from objects, organisms,
places, and persons. But in this universe, the agent’s losses do not
require her to be mortal. Nor does the permanent separation from
objects, organisms, places, and persons require that any of these,
especially other persons, be transient. All that it takes for these
losses to be real is that there are opportunities and entities that
become permanently inaccessible as she moves in the unending
garden of continuously and permanently forking paths.
A web of opportunities with this infinite structural scarcity
is in principle conceivable. In a universe that supports this scarcity,
therefore, there could be immortal agents whose existence sup-
ports CoDA. Hence I conjecture that there is a conceptually co-
herent kind of immortal existence that we can in principle rec-
ognize and potentially desire. As long as this conjecture stands,
one can no longer claim that mortality is a necessary condition of
up on another occasion. For the role that some repeatable activities and
experiences might play in the desirability of immortality, see Fischer’s
important proposal in Fischer (1994), Fischer (2013), and Fischer and
Mitchell-Yellin (2014).
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CoDA. And if so, the reconciliatory strategy is in trouble. It can
no longer claim that that we must reconcile with mortal existence
as the only conceptually coherent one.19
3.6.2 It is notoriously difficult to offer a positive proof of a conjec-
ture about conceivability, so I won’t attempt one here. But I will
try to garner some indirect support for it by rejecting the most
serious objection to it—the claim that an immortal agent would
necessarily and permanently enter into a condition of structural
abundance.
There are two ways to argue for the necessity of structural
abundance over an infinite existence. First, one might claim that
an infinitely long existence is ipso facto an existence of maximal
substantial abundance. This is an existence where all possible per-
mutations of all possible opportunities will sooner or later occur
so that no opportunity for action is ever really permanently in-
accessible. Some opportunities might be temporarily blocked, so
that the immortal agent might still need to exercise minimal di-
achronic agency in handling a temporarily limited range of op-
tions. But the opportunity costs are only local and transitory.
They are completely reversible at a later time when one can once
again choose to follow paths that were previously passed up.
3.6.3 Second, one might argue for an ‘end of history’ scenario:
an infinitely long existence necessarily takes the agent into a per-
manently restricted structural abundance. That is, a scenario in
which there is only a limited set of open options but such that all
of these options are permanently available in the mode of struc-
tural abundance (see 2).
This ‘end of history’ strategy seems harder to pursue. One
19 Rosati, who correctly insists on the importance of the scarcity of
opportunities for the understanding of the distinctive features of our
existence and agency, at some point calls this scarcity ‘a kind ofmortality
that arises repeatedly within a life,’ Rosati (2007: 244, my emphasis).
This is a bit disingenuous and should not be read as a concession to the
reconciliatory view. It is just a way for Rosati to highlight that there is
a pervasive finitude in our existence, one that we might think akin to
genuine mortality but that, as I am arguing here, should not really be
confused with it.
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would have to show that under all possible circumstances, any end-
less existence would necessarily lead into some kinds of restricted
structural abundance. But why should we think that an infinite
temporal extension necessarily brings about the shrinking of avail-
able opportunities under all possible conditions? If anything, the
thought of infinite existence seems to suggest the opposite: the
maximal availability of opportunities of the first scenario—that of
maximal substantial abundance. The best case for restricted struc-
tural abundance is to suggest, with Smuts (2011), that immortal
agents would have a fixed set of limited abilities and, therefore,
would eventually run out of things they could accomplish. But
why should we think that immortality entails that agents have
fixed abilities? And even if it did entail this, why should we think
that there are no goals or projects that could be pursued indefi-
nitely by agents with fixed abilities? It does not seem to me that
one could establish either of these two assumptions simply on the
basis of the notion of an immortal existence.
3.6.4 The first strategy—that of maximal substantial abundance—
appears more promising. In this case, it is clearer how this abun-
dance is supposed to ensue from immortality. The thought is that
for any immortal agent, over the infinite amount of time of her
existence, every possible combination of opportunities for action
would, sooner or later, become available (see Smuts 2011: 143, and
May 2009). Those who find this picture of immortality plausible
insist on its unrecognizability. They describe it as ‘motivationally
devastating’ and ‘shapeless,’ as lacking any of the distinctively hu-
man urgencies, losses, and regrets, and as devoid of meaning and
significance (see in particular May 2009: 68, Smuts 2008, Smuts
2011, and ‘early’ Nussbaum 1994).
These philosophers are correct in pointing out the devastat-
ing effects of maximal abundance. These effects are exactly what
we should expect given that maximal abundance leaves no room
for CoDA.20 But to reject my conjecture that immortality might
be compatible with perpetual scarcity, one needs to establish that
20 Notice that CoDA would still get a foothold in the ‘end of history’
scenario. This kind of immortal life, therefore, could be recognizable
and potentially desirable at least up until the time when one transitions
into the condition of permanent structural abundance.
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immortality necessarily gives rise to maximal abundance. Unfortu-
nately, no such argument is offered by those who equate immor-
tality with abundance. In their writings, they simply assume what
Borges (1964: 114) tells us about the immortals, that they know
“that in an infinite period of time, all things happen to all men.”21
3.6.5 Those who equate immortality with abundance assume what
might be called a ‘combinatorial’ view of infinite existence. In so
doing, they ignore at least two other basic ways in which infinite
time might affect the circumstances of action. First, the ‘cyclical’
model (as exemplified by eternal recurrence) in which the same set
of circumstances (and, possibly, of the corresponding actions) re-
peats itself over and over ad infinitum. Second, the ‘directional’
model that underlies my conjecture, where infinite time continues
to allow for some persistent scarcity of opportunities.
I do not think that the notion of an infinite time by itself
rules out any of these three models of immortal life. This is all that
I need to show for my conjecture to succeed in undermining the
reconciliatory account. Although the combinatorial model (and
possibly the cyclical one as well) might be incompatible with a
recognizable existence that supports CoDA, the directional model
is compatible with scarcity and thus with CoDA. Hence, as long as
the directional model is not ruled out by the very idea of infinite
time, my objection to the reconciliatory account still stands.
3.7 Contingent Immortality
3.7.1 Up to this point, my discussion has been framed according
to the standard interpretation of both mortality and immortality
as necessary conditions, that is, mortal beings necessarily die, and
immortal ones necessarily live forever.22 But there is a third no-
tion that is rarely discussed, that of contingent immortality. For a
21 See also the description of the Homeric gods in Nussbaum (1994),
“who can easily do anything they want any time they want,” Nussbaum
(2013: 36).
22 Or more generally, immortality is interpreted as guaranteed: either
one necessarily lives forever or one is guaranteed to continue to live as
long as one chooses to do so, as it happens in the case of Elina Makrop-
ulos in Williams (1973).
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contingently immortal agent death is not necessary. Such an agent
might end up living forever provided she continues to succeed at
overcoming the potentially lethal threats that she might encounter
throughout her existence.23
3.7.2 Does the notion of contingent immortality make a differ-
ence to my argument against the reconciliatory strategy? I am
going to argue that it doesn’t. If immortality is not guaranteed, an
agent can be said to be ‘potentially immortal.’ Such an agent could
become actually immortal only by a combination of skill and luck.
She needs to be lucky with respect to the potentially fatal events
over which she has no control. She needs skill, instead, to handle
the threats over which she has some control. To the extent that her
continuous survival depends on her skills, her immortality would
be an achievement. But an achievement that she might never reach
once and for all, if potentially lethal threats continue to arise for
ever and ever.
A potentially immortal agent might incur some opportu-
nity costs that are very similar to those of a necessarily mortal
agent. Both kinds of agent face the dangers to lose their lives. The
opportunity costs for the potentially immortal agent might actu-
ally be much higher since she has much more to lose in dying.
She would lose a potentially infinitely long life, rather than just a
longer one. Because of the danger of death and the need to take
risks with respect to it, there is a central dimension of the plight of
potentially immortal agents that is utterly missed by agents whose
immortality is guaranteed, even when the latter ones operate un-
der persistent structural scarcity.
3.7.3 It might be argued that contingent immortality shows that
there is more to CoDA than just structural scarcity. In particu-
lar, structural scarcity cannot account by itself for the distinctive
achievement of skillfully avoiding or overcoming potentially lethal
threats. Agency—it might be plausibly argued—can be fully un-
derstood only in connection with the notion of a life that requires
‘survival’ in the face of the ultimate danger of death. That is, we
23 A version of contingent immortality is introduced by Steele (1976)
and gets some rather limited discussion in Burley (2009b), Scheffler
(2013), and Fischer (2013).
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can make sense of agency only in connection with mortality in
the sense of the constant liability to (rather than the ineluctability
of) death. Or, in other words, we can make sense of agency only
together with the power to keep oneself alive, i.e., the power of
self-maintenance against the threat of annihilation.
This power of self-maintenance need not be interpreted only
in biological terms. The survival of rational agency might require
a form of psychological self-maintenance in response to a funda-
mental ontological vulnerability of the rational and psychological
unity of an agent. Following Korsgaard (2009), one might plau-
sibly argue that a rational agent is the product of a process of
self-constitution in response to potentially disruptive psychologi-
cal forces (which, in principle, might operate independently of the
vulnerabilities generated by our biological and physical nature). If
so, the temporal existence of an agent might require not just the
CoDA generated by structural scarcity but also those related to
her potential mortality, to her constant facing and struggling with
the danger of death.
3.7.4 How would the prospect of reconciliation look like if we
consider this kind of potential mortality? Let’s first distinguish
between two kinds of liability to death: (a) liability to fatal events
outside of our control, and (b) liability to irremediable failures of
self-constitution.
In being liable to death by uncontrollable events, we are
distinctively fragile: our survival is ultimately hostage to fortune.
This fragility shapes in substantive ways our actual lives. It would
also shape in similar ways the lives of potentially immortal agents.
This liability, however, does not seem to be necessary for the con-
ceivability of a temporal existence as a diachronic agent. In this
way, it is unlike both the scarcity of opportunities and the liabil-
ity to failures of self-constitution. Thus, I contend, we might have
no reason to reconcile with this mortality as the liability to un-
controllable fatal events. We might justifiably lament this fragility,
even while we acknowledge that it is an inescapable feature of our
lives.
3.7.5 By contrast, it should not be difficult to reconcile ourselves
with the liability to irremediable failures of self-constitution pro-
36
vided that these failures are ultimately due to catastrophic errors
in the exercise of our own rational powers. We might desire that
the job of rational survival be easier. But we cannot but accept the
liability to these catastrophic errors if this liability is indeed shown
to be a necessary precondition of the very possibility of our being
under the guidance of the demands of rationality and, thereby, of
the very possibility of our continuing to exist as rational agents.24
In other words, we should accept all the toil and anxious striving
of rational self-constitution as long as it is the necessary counter-
part of our existence, and as long as the blame for any fatal failure
would ultimately rest only on ourselves as we try to exercise our
rational powers.
This reconciliation with liability to fatal failures of rational
self-constitution does not help, however, to reconcile with mor-
tality as the necessity of death. Being liable to failures of self-
constitution, by itself, does not rule out that our rational pow-
ers, when properly exercised, might secure a continuous and po-
tentially indefinite survival under the proper conditions. What
might be constitutive of diachronic agency is only our subjection
to the constant danger of death by a catastrophic failure of self-
constitution, not the inevitability of our eventual demise by an
actual failure.
3.8 Cosmic Regret
3.8.1 The conclusion of the previous section shows that, even if
we add the liability to failures of self-constitution to structural
scarcity, we can still conceive of an immortal existence that grounds
CoDA. Let me stress once again that I am only offering a con-
jecture about the conceivability of a certain kind of immortal ex-
istence. I am not arguing that in our actual world time is both
infinite and supportive of perpetual structural scarcity.
I am only concerned with conceivability because this is all
that is required to assess the fate of the reconciliatory strategy. To
be reconciled with our necessary mortality, we need an antidote
24 For a general discussion of the relation between liability to error
and rational guidance, see Lavin (2004).
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against what might be called ‘cosmic regret.’ This is the regret we
might experience when realizing that, just in our capacity as tem-
poral agents, we could conceive of a mode of existence that retains
the core features of diachronic agency without necessitating death.
When so, we might feel disappointment and sorrow at the thought
that we live in a world that does not allow us to have a recognizable
(and potentially desirable and meaningful) immortal life. Even if
we acknowledge that many attractive features of the human con-
dition would be lost in such a universe, this does not prevent us
from seeing something appealing in this immortal existence and to
find lamentable that we are deprived of it.
3.8.2 This is regret is different from both agent-regret—which con-
cerns the effects of our faulty or blameworthy actions—and choice-
regret—which concerns the opportunities we missed or forfeited
as a result of our choices, whether they were correct or not. Cos-
mic regret, instead, reflects both (i) our understanding of the basic
nature of diachronic agency and temporal existence and (ii) our
acknowledgement that the universe could have turned out differ-
ently; that it could have allowed for us to be potentially immortal
while retaining both our capacity for diachronic agency and the
grounds for CoDA.
Is the avoidance of cosmic regret too high a desideratum
to impose on any successful reconciliation with mortality? I do
not think so. In attempting the reconciliation, the stakes are very
high. We are trying to figure out what to make of the most ba-
sic aspects of our existence. This is why, in these speculations,
the only thing that we should keep fixed is just our condition as
self-conscious subjects with the power of diachronic agency. The
immortal life that we might be able to recognize (and possibly long
for) might turn out to be possible only in a universe that, except
for its support of the fundamental features of diachronic agency, is
very remote from our own.
3.8.3 Notice that I am not denying that there is much more to
our existence than just our condition as diachronic agents. We can
see ourselves under thicker conceptions, including the conception
as human beings, with a distinctive physical and biological nature.
There are properties essential to us under these other conceptions
that might make us necessarily mortal. There could be things that
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we cherish and value that that go beyond the basic elements of
CoDA and that might necessarily depend on properties, such as
our distinctive vulnerabilities as biological organisms, that make
us mortal. Hence, when we look at ourselves under these thicker
conceptions, we might indeed be able to find some consolation at
the prospect of our necessary death. But this does not necessarily
tell against cosmic regret for the immortality that is not granted to
us. Insofar as we can make at least a notional distinction between
our different conceptions, the one as diachronic agents and the one
as human beings, say, we can still coherently project our existence
in the mode of diachronic agents into an endless future.
Hence, we can at the same time both embrace and regret
our necessary mortality without inconsistency. There are differ-
ent dimensions and guises under which we can assess our life and
the prospect of death. And in this exercise, we can compare our
life to different sorts of alternative existences. Ultimately, we can
harbor contrasting attitudes toward our mortality because there is
more than one legitimate question that we might ask about the al-
leged badness of our death (see Velleman 2012). Hence, we should
not be surprised if our stance toward mortality, although not in-
consistent, is often rife with ambiguity.
3.8.4 In this paper, I am concerned with our response to mortal-
ity in the most general form, as something that might affect us
under the broadest conception of ourselves as diachronic agents. It
is with respect to this conception of ourselves that, I have claimed,
we can feel cosmic regret for a kind of immortality that has not
been granted to us.
Notice that this regret is cosmic in object, not necessarily in
intensity. The very remoteness of the universe in which we might
have such immortal existence might prevent us from falling into
a devastating despair. In addition, in mourning this missed im-
mortality, we must realize that the grounds of what we might find
appealing about it are already available in our actual and mortal
human form: the structural scarcity and the liability to failures of
self-constitution. The basic structure of any conceivable immor-
tal existence is the same as that of our actual existence, except that,
for better or for worse, the immortal existence is supposed to carry
this structure for a lot longer.
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3.8.5 Is the longer and indefinite duration preferable? Thus far I
have always talked about the ‘potential’ desirability of immortal-
ity. The conceptual recognizability of immortality-cum-scarcity
does not entail either the absolute or relative attractiveness of this
immortality (under any of the possible dimensions under which
lives might be attractive, including, as Rosati (2013: §2.2) correctly
remarks, their being meaningful, morally valuable, aesthetically
pleasing, or personally good).
There are two reasons why recognizability does not entail
desirability. First, a persistent structural scarcity does not guar-
antee that the scarce opportunities are at all appealing. It is pos-
sible that all available options are most undesirable and that the
opportunity costs that one incurs are not only irremediable but
also a continuous and never ending source of suffering.25 Whe-
ther immortality-cum-scarcity is desirable ultimately depends on
the actual geography of the state space, and the web of opportu-
nities that it affords to any particular agent based on her specific
location in that space. There is no guarantee that any given agent
is always going to find at least one open path that will make her
endless journey along it choiceworthy.
3.8.6 A second reason to doubt that recognizability entails desir-
ability is the worry that, over the long run, all agents might end up
with no desirable options, regardless of their starting points and
subsequent choices. The concern is that there might be no gen-
uinely inexhaustible goods. Even if structurally scarcity is peren-
nial, so that the preconditions for the genuine pursuit of goods
might never go away, the goods themselves might at some point
necessarily run out.
In the discussions of immortality, it is often remarked that
inexhaustible goods might be offered by such things as friendship,
artistic creativity, or aesthetic experience (and possibly the con-
templation of truth, goodness, beauty, or God—at least as long
as this contemplation is supposed to take place over time rather
than in timeless eternity). But I think we should be cautious about
accepting claims of this kind if they are just based on projections
into the infinite future of intuitions about goods that we have only
25 For a similar worry, see Kolodny (2013: 167).
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experienced under finite conditions. There might be principled
reasons to think that these goods are indeed inexhaustible, but we
need an argument to this effect.
My conjecture about the conceivability of an immortal ex-
istence also relies on a projection into the infinite time but I feel
more confident about it than any claim about the goods. The con-
siderations that I have advanced here are only based on structural
considerations about the nature of diachronic agency and the pos-
sible topology of the state space and the agent’s trajectories in it.
This conjecture still leaves open the issue whether such a structure
might be filled with inexhaustible substantive goods, a question
that would have to be taken up on another occasion.26
4 CONCLUSION
4.1 The Failed Promise of Reconciliation
4.1.1 The reconciliatory strategy promised to offer the ultimate
consolation for our mortality. It was supposed to show that we
should embrace our necessary temporal finitude as constitutive of
what is distinctive of our value-laden temporal agency and exis-
tence, and thereby give up the conceptually confused wish for im-
mortal existence. Unfortunately, this strategy fails. This is not to
deny that it has some merits. The strategy offers the best possible
schema for ultimate consolation. It is also correct in the substan-
tive characterization of the distinctive features of our existence.
Finally, it is correct in claiming that our finitude is constitutive
of these features. But there are several dimensions to our finitude
and the strategy ends up focusing on the wrong one—the necessary
temporal finitude of our existence.27
26 There is an additional issue that has to be left for another occasion:
Could it be that what is conceptually confused is not the idea of an
immortal life but that of its desirability? This is an intriguing suggestion
raised by Altshuler (2016). Unfortunately, I have become acquainted
with Altshuler’s proposal too late to properly discuss it in this paper.
27 In fairness to the proponents of the reconciliatory strategy, I want
to acknowledge that they often start by mentioning the more general
finitude and by suggesting that this finitude is related to the distinctive
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As I have shown in this paper, there are several ways in
which we are finite and bounded: our existence can be temporally
finite, the temporal horizon of identification and integration can
be limited, goods might be exhaustible, we might be liable to po-
tentially fatal dangers and catastrophic failures of self-constitution,
and we might be acting under structural scarcity of opportunities.
I have argued that only structural scarcity (possibly combined with
the liability to failures of self-constitution) is constitutive of the
fundamental and distinctive features of our temporal existence as
diachronic agents.
I conjectured that there might be a world that could sup-
port the existence of immortal agents who grapple with a persis-
tent structural scarcity and thus have a life that might ground the
basic features of what we recognize, cherish, and value in our own
mortal existence. As long as this conjecture stands, the reconcil-
iatory strategy cannot deliver on its promise: we cannot console
ourselves for our mortality as being necessary to ground any con-
ceivable and desirable existence.
4.1.2 Unlike many common pictures of immortality, the one I
offer here is not a conceptually confused product of naïve imagina-
tion. Rather, it offers a genuine ‘intimation of immortality.’ Not
an intimation of actual immortality but of the kind of endless ex-
istence that we, in our capacity as diachronic agents, could lead,
even if only in a very remote universe and at the cost of losing
many distinctive aspects of human existence.28
This immortal existence is not only conceivable but also
potentially appealing. And this is why we might regret not being
features of our existence. But then these discussions immediately turn
their focus exclusively on mortality as temporal finitude. In so doing
they fail to distinguish the contributions of the other dimensions of fini-
tude and, more damagingly, they fail to realize that the reconciliatory
strategy might thereby fail to establish its conclusion.
28 In talking about ‘intimations of immortality’ I am echoing the con-
clusion reached by Rosati (2013). Like her, I am claiming that the longing
for a potentially indefinitely long existence is not conceptually confused
but it actually expresses a central aspect of our agency. Where we differ is
on the dimension of agency that gets so expressed. I focus on diachronic-
ity, while she focuses on autonomy and self-governance.
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immortal. This is not to claim that we would necessarily prefer to
be immortal. The goods promised by an endless existence might
not be unalloyed, which would explain the deep ambivalence we
often feel toward our mortality.
I suspect that, if we were to face an actual choice between
a mortal and an immortal life, we would not be unreasonable in
opting for the finite one. But this choice appears dilemmatic. The
two options are likely to be incomparable; no matter which one
we were to decide on, we could still justifiably regret the perma-
nent loss of the goods offered only by the other kind of life. But
this loss is not something we can presently deplore. Given our
necessary mortality, we are deprived of the very possibility to face
this dilemma.
Sometimes we are grateful to be spared dilemmatic situa-
tions. But in this case, it is lamentable that we are not offered the
opportunity to make up our mind. Even if we were to settle for a
finite life, we can still acknowledge that there is some incomparable
value in an endless existence, a value that would be permanently
lost to us in choosing to die. Hence, what we might ultimately
mourn about our necessary mortality is not our eventual death
but the impossibility to regret the loss of the value that we would
give up in rejecting immortality.
References
Altshuler, R. (2016). Immortality, Identity, and Desirability. In Cholbi, M., editor,
Immortality and the Philosophy of Death, pages 191–203. Rowman & Littlefield Pub-
lishers.
Bagnoli, C. (2000). Value in The Guise of Regret. Philosophical Explorations, 3:165–187.
Bagnoli, C. (2016). Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical Reason. In Strahele,
C., editor, Vulnerability in Context, chapter 4. Routledge.
Borges, J. L. (1964). The Immortal. In Donald A. Yates, J. E. I., editor, Labyrinths:
Selected Stories Other Writings. New Directions, New York.
Bortolotti, L. and Nagasawa, Y. (2009). Immortality without Boredom. Ratio, 22(3):261–
277.
Brooks, P. (2012). Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. Alfred A.
Knopf.
Burley, M. (2009a). Immortality and Boredom: A Response to Wisnewski. International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 65(2):77–85.
43
Burley, M. (2009b). Immortality and Meaning: Reflections on the Makropulos Debate.
Philosophy, 84(4):529–547.
Dennett, D. C. (1996). Kinds of Things. Harper Collins.
Ferrero, L. (2009). What Good is a Diachronic Will? Philosophical Studies, 144(3):403–
430.
Ferrero, L. (2012). Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality. Philosophical Issues,
22(1):144–164.
Fischer, J. M. (1994). Why Immortality is Not So Bad. International Journal of Philo-
sophical Studies, 2(2):257–270.
Fischer, J. M. (2005). Free Will, Death, and Immortality: The Role of Narrative. Philo-
sophical Papers, 34(3):379–403.
Fischer, J. M. (2013). Immortality. In Bradley, B., Feldman, F., and Johansson, J., editors,
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oxford University Press.
Fischer, J. M. and Mitchell-Yellin, B. (2014). Immortality and Boredom. Journal of Ethics,
18(4):353–372.
Helm, P. (2014). Eternity. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Spring 2014 edition.
Ismael, J. T. (2006). The Ethical Importance of Death. In Tandy, C., editor, Death and
Anti-Death: Twenty Years After De Beauvoir, Thirty Years After Heidegger, volume 4,
pages 181–198. Ria University Press.
Kermode, F. (2000). The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction. Oxford
University Press, USA.
Kolodny, N. (2013). That I Should Die and Others Live. In Scheffler, S. and Kolodny,
N., editors, Death and the Afterlife. Oxford University Press.
Korsgaard, C. (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford University
Press.
Lavin, D. (2004). Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error. Ethics, 114:424–457.
Malpas, J. E. (1998). Death and the Unity of a Life. In Malpas, J. E. and Solomon, R. C.,
editors, Death and Philosophy, pages 120–134. Routledge.
May, T. (2009). Death. Acumen, Durham.
Nagel, T. (1970). Death. Noûs, 4(1):73–80.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1989). Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Na-
ture. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50(2):303–351.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1994). The Therapy of Desire. Princeton University Press.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1999). Reply to Papers in Symposium on Nussbaum, The Therapy
of Desire. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(3):811–819.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2013). The Damage of Death: Incomplete Arguments and False
Consolations. In Taylor, J. S., editor, The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death, pages 25–43.
Oxford University Press.
Rosati, C. S. (2007). Mortality, Agency, and Regret. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of
the Sciences and the Humanities, 94(1):231–259.
Rosati, C. S. (2013). The Makropulos Case Revisited: Reflections on Immortality and
Agency. In Bradley, B., Feldman, F., and Johansson, J., editors, The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophy of Death, pages 355–390. Oxford University Press.
Scheffler, S. (2013). Death and the Afterlife. Oxford University Press.
Smuts, A. (2008). Wings of Desire: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality. Film and
Philosophy, 13(1):137–151.
44
Smuts, A. (2011). Immortality and Significance. Philosophy and Literature, 35(1):134–149.
Steele, H. (1976). Could Body-Bound Immortality be Liveable? Mind, 85(339):424–427.
Strawson, G. (2004). Against Narrativity. Ratio, 17(4):428–452.
Tolstoy, L. N. (1884). A Confession and Other Religious Writings. Viking Penguin, New
York.
Velleman, J. D. (2012). Comments on John Martin Fischer’s Our Stories. Philosophical
Studies, 158(3):515–521.
Williams, B. (1973). The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality.
In Problems of the Self, pages 82–100. Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. (2009). Life as Narrative. European Journal of Philosophy, 17(2):305–314.
45
